

# Market Based Traffic Coordination

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ABJ70 Committee: Artificial Intelligence and Advanced Computing Applications  
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The work presented was done while the speaker was affiliated to **DaimlerChrysler Telematic Research**  
Part of this work was done in cooperation  
with **Wolfgang Spering** (DaimlerChrysler) and **William Coughlin** (CEO Ford Global Technologies)

**Problem Target**

**Target**

**Dynamic Route Navigation on Roads**

*Basic Concept*

*Simulation Results*

**Problem**

Congestions shift from one road to another because all drivers try to escape the same way

*Road Pricing*

*Toll-free Roads*

*Extended Concept*

**Suggested Solution**

Coordinate drivers and make different suggestions

*Summary*

*Practical issues*

**Problem**

Drivers do not want to get domineered

**Suggested Solution**

Let drivers prioritize the routes by different ratings that they give to the routes

**Problem Target**

*Basic Concept*

*Simulation Results*

*Road Pricing*

*Toll-free Roads*

*Extended Concept*

*Summary*

*Practical issues*

**Target**

**Individual Dynamic Route Navigation on Roads**

## Application 1: Individual Route Guidance

Guide driver on most convenient route to his destination considering

- current traffic conditions
- individual priorities of guided driver
- compromise with priorities of other drivers

## Application 2: Individual Road Clearance

Provide free lane for driver considering

- current traffic conditions
- individual speed priority for guided driver
- compromise with speed priorities of other drivers

**Problem Target**

**Target**

**Individual Dynamic Route Navigation on Roads**

*Basic Concept*

*Simulation Results*

*Road Pricing*

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*Extended Concept*

*Summary*

*Practical issues*

**Application 1: Individual Route Guidance**

**Application 2: Individual Road Clearance**

**Objectives to be considered**

Design coordination mechanisms with following properties:

- mechanism must not require active input of driver while he is driving
- driver's priorities should be considered
- overall optimum should be considered

*Problem Target*

***Basic Concept***

*Simulation Results*

*Road Pricing*

*Toll-free Roads*

*Extended Concept*


*Summary*

*Practical issues*


## Concept

### Auction Based Traffic Control (ABTC)


- for each vehicle:



- for traffic control center:



- knows current traffic conditions
- accepts queries for routes from start to end and answers with several routes
- communicates impartial route properties



- distributes rights for segment usage via auctions

*Problem Target*

***Basic Concept***

*Simulation Results*


*Road Pricing*

*Toll-free Roads*

*Extended Concept*

*Summary*

*Practical issues*



*Problem Target*

*Basic Concept*

***Simulation Results***

*Road Pricing*

*Toll-free Roads*

*Extended Concept*

*Summary*

*Practical issues*

## Performance of ABTC implementation

### Tested Scenarios:

- several different digital maps for roads (from 200 up to 1200 road segments)
- different pairs (start, end) für the test vehicles
- different numbers of vehicles per hour (from 2000 up to 10000)

### Issues of investigation:

1. How good were the results ?

- ca. 70 % of all vehicles got the most favored route

2. How fast was the computation ?

- auctions lasted between 30 sec and 2 min

*Problem Target*

*Basic Concept*

***Simulation Results***

*Road Pricing*

*Toll-free Roads*

*Extended Concept*

*Summary*

*Practical issues*

## Benefit of ABTC concept

### Question examined:

What is the benefit of auction based coordination compared to traditional traffic guiding methods ?

### Test:

Compare different percentages of auction based controlled vehicles among all vehicles

### Results:

- for > 30 % auction based vehicles: visible improvements

- for > 50 % auction based vehicles: nearly optimal improvements



- Problem Target*
- Basic Concept*
- Simulation Results*
- Road Pricing**
- Toll-free Roads*
- Extended Concept*
- Summary*
- Practical issues*

## Prime Application

Road Pricing

ABTC applies the following techniques:

Two kinds of auction budgets:

•virtual

•for prioritizing the vehicle classes

•real

•for charging the toll

Two possible toll concepts:

•Fixed Tolls

•Buy a road by an auction using the virtual budget  
•Pay fixed fee for the actual usage

•Toll Ranges

•Fix minimum and maximum fee for each segment  
•Buy segment by overbidding of minimum fee up to the maximum fee

## Software employed

### 1) Simulation Tool PROROAD

(made by FZI Karlsruhe in commission of DC traffic research )

•Traffic Simulation

•Route Computation

•„Traditional“ dynamic routing

### 2) Implementation of AVIR concepts in Java

(by AVIR team)

Test Results

## Simulation Tool PROROAD (made by FZI Karlsruhe)

### Software Demonstration

The screenshot displays the PROROAD simulation tool interface. The main window is titled "Sim Replay" and features a toolbar with buttons for "Exit", "Load File", navigation arrows, "Pause", "Select Time", "Stop", "1>", ">", ">>", "Result Table", and "Toggle Route-Split".

The central area shows a network map with nodes and edges. Labeled nodes include Ludwigsburg, Waiblingen, Stuttgart, Esslingen, and Böblingen. A large white circle highlights the Stuttgart area. Various colored markers (yellow, blue, pink) are placed on the network.

On the right side, there is a "Simulation Results" panel with the following data:

Simulation Results	
Route Searches	
Drivers	: 21353
Route Searches	
Computers	: 1008
Vehicles	: 24405
Messages	
accepted	: 2101
Messages	
received	: 151596
Messages	
created	: 1091
Vehicle (FCD)	
Messages	: Jam-Leav Jam-Stay Collecti Road-Typ

Below the results panel is a "Simulation Time" section showing:

08: 01: 00  
Scenario Number  
"Jam35Infrastructure5Flow2 |  
610Fed100"  
Playing

At the bottom left, there is a command line area with several "Command:" prompts and a cursor.



A legend at the bottom of the window reads: "M: Draw Visibility Pane; R: Menu of completions."

# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

## Auction Based Traffic Control

No Coordination

50 % Auction-Based  
Coordination





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# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

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

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

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No Coordination

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Coordination





Time 07:09

# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

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No Coordination

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Coordination



Time 07:12





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

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

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# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

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Coordination





Time 07:21

# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

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No Coordination

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Coordination





Time 07:24

# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

## Auction Based Traffic Control

No Coordination

50 % Auction-Based  
Coordination





Time 07:27

# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

## Auction Based Traffic Control

No Coordination

50 % Auction-Based  
Coordination





Time 07:30

# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

## Auction Based Traffic Control

No Coordination

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Coordination





Time 07:33

# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

## Auction Based Traffic Control

No Coordination

50 % Auction-Based  
Coordination



Time 07:36





# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

## Auction Based Traffic Control

No Coordination

50 % Auction-Based  
Coordination





Time 07:39

# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

## Auction Based Traffic Control

No Coordination

50 % Auction-Based  
Coordination





Time 07:42

# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

## Auction Based Traffic Control

No Coordination

50 % Auction-Based  
Coordination





Time 07:45

# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

## Auction Based Traffic Control

No Coordination

50 % Auction-Based  
Coordination





Time 07:48

# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

## Auction Based Traffic Control

No Coordination

50 % Auction-Based  
Coordination





Time 07:51

# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

## Auction Based Traffic Control

No Coordination

50 % Auction-Based  
Coordination





Time 07:54

# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

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No Coordination

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Coordination





Time 07:57

# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

## Auction Based Traffic Control

No Coordination

50 % Auction-Based  
Coordination



Time 08:00





# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

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Coordination





Time 08:03

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

Time 08:06

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

Time 08:09

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

Time 08:12

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

Time 08:15

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

Time 08:18

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

Time 08:21

# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

## Auction Based Traffic Control

No Coordination

50 % Auction-Based  
Coordination



Time 08:24





# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

## Auction Based Traffic Control

No Coordination

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

Time 08:27

# Market-Based Traffic Coordination

## Auction Based Traffic Control

No Coordination

50 % Auction-Based  
Coordination



Time 08:30

End of  
Simulation

*Problem Target*

*Basic Concept*

*Simulation Results*

***Road Pricing***

*Toll-free Roads*

*Extended Concept*

*Summary*

*Practical issues*

**Prime Application**

Road Pricing

**Advantages of ABTC for Road Pricing:**

- enables toll collection by supply and demand
- makes a better utilization of scarce road resources
- considers and enables individual needs of users
- supports new traffic concepts

**Ideal Application: Toll Lanes**

- Problem Target*
- Basic Concept*
- Simulation Results*
- Road Pricing*
- Toll-free Roads***
- Extended Concept*
- Summary*
- Practical issues*

## ABTC even works for toll-free roads !

### Observation:

Bidding with virtual budgets

=

Giving priorities to the roads using a uniform scale

ABTC may be used for toll-free roads with 100 % virtual budgets


### ABTC for toll roads:

charge fee in relation to bids of agents

### ABTC for toll-free roads:

- assign using rights in relation to bids of agents
- do not collect fees for actual usage

### Problem



Disobeying the assignments has no consequences for drivers

*Problem Target*

*Basic Concept*

*Simulation Results*

*Road Pricing*

***Toll-free Roads***

*Extended Concept*

*Summary*

*Practical issues*

**ABTC even works for toll-free roads !**

**How to make it attractive for drivers  
to follow coordination assignments ?**

**Basic principle of this approach**

**Drivers who get a more advantageous assignment  
have to pay to  
drivers who get a less advantageous assignment**

- payment need not be directly from driver to driver
- payment need not involve real money

**→ ABTC for toll-free roads results in auction-based trading**

- Problem Target*
- Basic Concept*
- Simulation Results*
- Road Pricing*
- Toll-free Roads*
- Extended Concept***
- Summary*
- Practical issues*

## Coordination for toll-free roads: Trading

### 3 alternative trading principles:

- **Auction-Based Trading**

most mature (already tested by simulation)

- **Exchange-Based Trading**

theoretically most suited for application Individual Route Guidance

enables traffic prediction on base of future intentions

- **Transactions between Predetermined Vehicles**

theoretically most suited for application Individual Road Clearance

## Auction-Based Trading

•let VDUs make bids for road segments (like in ABTC)

•assign road segments in auction (like in ABTC)

•collect fees for road segments used according to latest bids (like for toll-roads)

•at end of auction round:  
redistribute collected fees uniformly among auction participants

### Problem

At time of bidding, one does not know if one will pay or get a refund

### Solution

For each segment, prescribe equilibrium bound  $m$  such that bids above  $m$  have to pay and bids below  $m$  get a refund (VDUs are charged or refunded proportional to their biddings)

Solution Details

## Exchange-Based Trading

- issue the goods of type „right to use road segments at a certain time“ into an exchange market with multiplicity corresponding to road segment capacity

- perform a call market for the rights to use road segments at a certain time, i.e. VDUs may buy and sell such rights at any time according to the call market rules

- assure that vehicles entering a road segment own the corresponding right  
=> If they do not own it before, they buy it automatically for current market price  
If no right is available, they must buy surplus rights for a surplus rate

Note that up to now using up rights would cost money !

- redistribute the money collected by the rights used up by travelling in periodic intervals among the exchange participants

**Solution Details**



## Transactions between Predetermined Vehicles

Auction-based trading: No direct transactions between vehicles

Exchange-based trading:

Only direct transactions between vehicles after price is determined  
For determination of price no direct negotiations

3rd technique:

Determine seller and buyer first  
Determine price thereafter

Prime application: Road cleaning

Several techniques possible following the principles:

- Drivers have to obey legal rules  
(no prevention of passing !)

- If A passes B such that B is not inconvenienced  
this costs less than in case that B has to reduce speed


Solution Details

## Transactions between Predetermined Vehicles

Different techniques:

- Bilateral trading

### Solution Details



- Continuous payment for passing

Use a degressive scale !

i.e.: the more a vehicle is passed, the cheaper is the cost for the pass

*Problem Target*

*Basic Concept*

*Simulation Results*

*Road Pricing*

*Toll-free Roads*

***Extended Concept***

*Summary*

*Practical issues*

## Coordination for toll-free roads: Trading

### Questions:

- How to make it attractive to participate in the coordination system ?
- How to prevent non-participators to obtain the same benefits ?

### Answers:

- provide new traffic-specific information exclusively for participants

E.g.: Use quotations in the exchange-based method for traffic predictions

- Include third-party offers into subscription system

E.g.: gas stations, shops, local advertisement

## Concept Summary

*Problem Target*

*Basic Concept*

*Simulation Results*

*Road Pricing*

*Toll-free Roads*

*Extended Concept*

***Summary***

*Practical issues*

### Purpose of existing dynamic navigation systems

Guide driver on most convenient route to his destination considering the current traffic conditions

### Problem

When dynamic navigation systems enter mass market  
=> congestions shift from one road to another  
because all drivers try to escape the same way

### Conclusion



**The penetration of any traffic advising system into mass market requires a coordination of users**



*Problem Target*

*Basic Concept*

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*Extended Concept*

**Summary**



*Practical issues*

## Concept Summary

### Software architecture

- for each vehicle:

- at a central platform:




- knows individual strategies of driver
- communicates automatically with Coordinator
- may get new instructions from driver at any time


- accepts queries from VDUs
- distributes using rights to VDUs
- knows current traffic situation

- Problem Target*
- Basic Concept*
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## Distribution of software on the existing hardware



**Alternative 1:  
VDUs on a central server**




**Alternative 2:  
VDUs in the vehicles**

**In any case:  
User interface for VDU in the vehicles**

- Problem Target*
- Basic Concept*
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## Possible platform for implementation in real life:



Toll collect 15 mts. demo video available at [www.toll-collect.de](http://www.toll-collect.de)  
(can be shown here)

- Problem Target*
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## Conclusion

**Distributed coordination  
instead of  
central coordination !**

**The End**

**Thank you for your attention !**